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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Woe is the life of the modern day student living in 
“Darkest Africa” for obviously we are still being kept in the 
slave quarters of the world. Harsh words? My friends try 
and live in a society where such Acts as the Intellectual 
Property Acts of the world [impede] your advancement in 
life.2 
If it is a sin for the poor to steal from the rich, it must be a 
much bigger sin for the rich to steal from the poor. Don’t 
rich countries pirate poor countries’ best scientists, 
engineers, doctors, nurses and programmers? When global 
corporations come to operate in the Philippines, don’t they 
pirate the best people from local firms? If it is bad for poor 
countries like ours to pirate the intellectual property of rich 
countries, isn’t it a lot worse for rich countries like the US 
to pirate our intellectuals? 
 In fact, we are benign enough to take only a copy, 
leaving the original behind; rich countries are so greedy 
that they take away the originals, leaving nothing behind.3 
Copyright law scholarship, certainly in the United States 
but elsewhere as well, tends to be rather fixated on “the latest 
case” or controversy. The more favored issues include how recent 
technological developments, such as the Internet, or peer-to-peer 
sharing, or new statutory provisions, such as the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act,4 the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act,5 or the E.U. Copyright Directive,6 are creating 
“new” copyright disputes and quagmires on almost a daily basis. 
These are the conference-generating copyright topics, colloquially 
the “sexy subjects” of the present conjuncture. By comparison, a 
                                                          
 2. Louise Szente, Misers or Sharers?, at http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j013/wipout/essays/ 
0923szente.htm (Sept. 23, 2001). 
 3. Roberto Verzola, Pegging the World’s Biggest, 12 EARTH ISLAND J. 41, 41 (1997), 
available at http://www.earthisland.org/eijournal/new_articles.cfm?articleID=311&journal 
ID=50. Verzola, a Filipino activist who has done some important writing on copyright 
issues in countries of the South, wrote this article in response to the comment by a 
representative for U.S. lobbying group Business Software Alliance that “[c]opying licensed 
software is a form of stealing.” 
 4. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 5. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). 
 6. Council Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in 
the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10. 
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critical analysis of the 117-year-old Berne Convention7 and, in 
particular, its negative effects on countries of the South8 and 
their citizens, appears to be decidedly out-of-fashion and, in fact, 
has never been in fashion. Articles on so-called copyright “piracy” 
in such countries have become the only occasion that copyright 
issues affecting more than three quarters of the world’s 
population receive any profile in mainstream legal commentary 
produced within the rich industrialised countries of the North. In 
other words, it is the legal complexities of the e-book rather than 
whether millions of people can get access to and read their first 
book or get affordable access to computer software—and 
copyright’s role in these and related global problems—that tends 
to preoccupy most copyright experts.9 
Berne’s shadow appears to be a rather pale one at first 
glance. Although it has long been recognised as one of the two 
leading international copyright conventions, Berne itself has not 
been amended since 1979 and, as far as this Author is aware, no 
country in the world—let alone a country of the South—is 
actively making proposals for any significant changes to Berne or 
                                                          
 7. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act, 
July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne]. See also SAM 
RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC 
WORKS: 1886–1986, at 79 (1987) (chronicling the history and details of the convention). 
The original convention was signed in Berne, Switzerland, in 1886. 
 8. I do not use the commonly used phrase “developing countries” because the 
words “developing countries” are, in my view, themselves misleading; many remain 
unconvinced that a number of countries are actually “developing.” A recent U.N. report 
revealed that fifty-four countries, mostly from sub-Saharan Africa, were poorer in 2000 
than they were in 1990. See Charlotte Denny, UN Fears Iraq Will Dominate Summit, 
GUARDIAN (London), May 30, 2003, at 24 (indicating that sub-Saharan Africa will likely 
not reach the target of halving the proportion of the population living on less than $1 per 
day). In any event, what does the word “developing” actually mean, and is mimicking the 
process of development followed by “developed countries” a viable or a desirable 
orientation? Analytic precision is lost as well if, for example, Brazil and Somalia are 
grouped together in a category called “developing countries.” I will instead use the term 
“countries of the South.” This phrase is itself admittedly problematic and I add the 
vigorous caveat that there is a great disparity among, between, and within such countries; 
the place of South Africa and the different South Africas within Africa is a good case in 
point. “The concept ‘development’, like the concept ‘growth’—both are borrowed from 
biology—is a natural metaphor meant to obscure and obfuscate the violence and crude 
exploitation that continue to characterise the relationship between ‘development’ and 
‘underdevelopment.’” Maria Mies, “Gender” and Global Capitalism, in CAPITALISM AND 
DEVELOPMENT 107, 107–08 (Leslie Sklair ed., 1994). 
 9. This is not meant to suggest that copyright or the absence of copyright 
restrictions is the principle barrier to access to materials or the principle cause of 
illiteracy in the countries of the South. As a South African librarian explained, “when 
most schools across Africa do not have anywhere near enough books or a photocopier or 
even a single computer, copyright is not really an issue, I wish it was.” ALAN STORY, 
STUDY ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE INTERNET, AND COPYRIGHT 13 (2002) 
(quoting librarian Colin Darch) [hereinafter STORY CIPR], available at 
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/study_papers/sp5_story_study.pdf. 
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its core doctrines. Indeed, within the increasingly vexed 
intellectual property relationships between rich and poorer 
countries, controversies over patents—whether about 
pharmaceutical patents for anti-HIV/AIDS drugs or plant 
patents and the phenomenon of biopiracy—have generated far 
more conflict than those based on copyright.10 Until recently, 
international intellectual property treaties and conventions such 
as Berne were essentially ignored; Berne was just “there,” 
perhaps a keystone of international copyright relationships, but 
hardly a source of either cutting-edge conflict or a topic for 
cutting-edge analysis.11 
Yet over the past fifteen years, Berne’s profile has expanded 
and become more pronounced—first when the United States, the 
world’s largest producer of copyright-protected works,12 became a 
signatory in 1988,13 and second when the 1994 Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)14 
incorporated the substantive provisions of Articles 1 through 21 
and the Appendix to the Berne Convention within its text.15 More 
                                                          
 10. When the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights was established in 2001 
to look at intellectual property issues for countries of the South, the commissioners were 
initially undecided whether to conduct a study into copyright-related issues. NGOs such 
as OXFAM that campaign on global intellectual property issues focus almost exclusively 
on patent-related matters. 
 11. See, e.g., Hugh Brett, Book Review, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 269, 269 (1999) 
(reviewing DANIEL J. GERVAIS, TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 
(1998)). 
 Life used to be a good deal simpler, as those who are over 50 will recall. 
Consider the responsibilities of the international civil servant in the 1970s, for 
example. If global copyright reform was in the air or the terms of the Paris 
Convention required adjustment, then a trip to the clean air of Geneva was 
called for and no one, if one is honest, took much notice. 
  The international I.P. treaties in those days, after all, did not have much 
bearing on U.K. laws, and in truth the terms of the treaties were to a great 
extent more honoured in their breach than in their observance. 
Id. 
 12. Refer to Part I.A infra (relying on statistics to conclude that the United States is 
the main producer, seller, and beneficiary of intellectual property exports). 
 13. The United States ratified the Berne Convention on October 31, 1988. Because 
treaties are generally not self-executing in the United States, the Berne Convention, 
along with the Berne Convention Implementation Act, did not become effective in the 
United States until March 1, 1989. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 
U.S.C.). 
 14. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 15. Id. art. 9(1). All countries that wish to become members of the World Trade 
Organization must also become signatories to TRIPS, and hence must comply with all of 
the key sections of Berne, with one exception: the protection of moral rights. Id.; Berne, 
supra note 7, art. 6bis(1) (granting noneconomic, or moral, rights to authors). 
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recently, new international agreements, such as the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, 
have self-consciously been built on Berne’s conceptual and 
philosophical foundations.16 For example, key phrases and 
concepts in Berne, such as “national treatment” and “normal 
exploitation of the work,” have been adopted in both TRIPS and 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty.17 And while some commentators 
have suggested that the long-term future of Berne as a distinct 
international instrument may, in time, be eclipsed by the scope 
and breadth of TRIPS,18 Berne’s provisions do provide a central 
element of the overall TRIPS package. More significantly for our 
purposes here, Berne’s key assumptions and ideology infuse the 
copyright agenda of both TRIPS and of the World Trade 
Organization that enforces its provisions. 
This Essay seeks to make and develop three main 
arguments: 
(1) For countries of the South, Berne’s concept of “national 
treatment”19 essentially means that the state apparatus of these 
countries is deployed to protect—within their own borders—the 
copyrighted works produced in rich, developed countries. 
National treatment means “treating things that are different as 
though they were exactly alike.”20 As implemented, national 
treatment promotes formal equality, but more importantly it 
reinforces substantive inequality and results in discriminatory 
and preferential treatment. 
(2) The purported balance or equilibrium of copyright—that 
is, a system that acts to balance the interests of owners and 
users—does not work, as a practical matter, in this globally 
unequal circumstance. The power inequality between corporate 
copyright owners in rich countries and users in poorer countries 
of the South reveals the theoretical incoherence of treating 
copyright as a balanced or balanceable system and suggests the 
nonapplicability of the “balance” metaphor in international 
copyright discourse.21 
                                                          
 16. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, pmbl., art. 1, S. TREATY DOC. 
NO. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997) [hereinafter WCT] (adopting “Articles 1 to 21 and the 
Appendix of the Berne Convention”). 
 17. Compare TRIPS, supra note 14, arts. 3, 13, with WCT, supra note 16, art. 10(2). 
 18. See Sam Ricketson, The Future of the Traditional Intellectual Property 
Conventions in the Brave New World of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, 26 
INT’L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 872, 898 (1995) [hereinafter Ricketson, 
Future of Intellectual Property]. 
 19. See Berne, supra note 7, art. 5 (requiring a nation to grant authors of fellow 
treaty countries all rights declared under domestic law, now and in the future). 
 20. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971). 
 21. Many of the arguments I make here about the nonapplicability of the balance 
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(3) The notions (e.g., “authorship”) and value systems 
justifying copyright are not universal but rather “transitory 
social constructs which grew out of a very specific set of economic 
and social conditions”22 in Western Europe and, as such, 
copyright represents a coercive cultural and legal incursion onto 
the terrain of countries of the South. 
As a result, the basic presumptions and practices of the 
Berne Convention work against the economic and access-to-
knowledge or information interests of peoples living in the 
countries of the South. For such peoples and countries, Berne 
operates as a Western-based and unreconstructed colonial relic 
which they had no role in drafting and which was imposed on 
them without consultation in an earlier era.23 Significant reform 
is extremely difficult, if not impossible: unanimity is required for 
amendment;24 compared to many other international legal 
instruments, the possibility of reservations is slight indeed;25 and 
the last serious attempt to reform Berne to better serve countries 
of the South during the 1960s led to the near collapse of the 
entire global copyright system during a period labelled “a crisis 
in international copyright.”26 The one addition made to Berne 
during that era which purported to improve the situation of poor 
countries—incorporation of the Paris Appendix—has certainly 
                                                          
metaphor in the international copyright sphere are also valid, with certain modifications, 
within the domestic copyright sphere. However, here the arguments are limited primarily 
to global copyright relationships. 
 22. Christopher D. Hunter, Copyright and Culture (2000), http://www.asc.upenn. 
edu/usr/chunter/copyright_and_culture.html (observing that copyright was seen as either 
an economic incentive for authors to produce content that would benefit the public, or as a 
valorisation of the “genius” author). 
 23. Many former colonies that today comprise most of the countries of the South 
became incorporated into Berne when they were under direct colonial rule. “When nations 
such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom signed the Berne Convention in 1886, 
they effectively committed their colonies to the Convention’s obligations.” PAUL 
GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 22 (2001). For 
example, all areas that were part of the British Empire in 1886 (e.g., many parts of Africa 
and Asia) have been under the jurisdiction of the Berne Convention since that date. When 
these colonies became formally independent countries, many during the 1950s and 1960s, 
they “increasingly chafed at the imposition of copyright treaty standards that had 
effectively been imposed on them by a foreign power.” Id. 
 24. See Berne, supra note 7, art. 27(3). 
 25. See RICKETSON, supra note 7, at 764–75 (noting how to create a reservation and 
summarizing which countries retain reservations from past conventions); see also Sam 
Ricketson, The Boundaries of Copyright: Its Proper Limitations and Expectations: 
International Conventions and Treaties, 1 INTELL. PROP. Q. 56, 75 (1999) [hereinafter 
Ricketson, Boundaries of Copyright] (commenting on the sparse allowance of reservations 
under the Brussels text). 
 26. Charles F. Johnson, The Origins of the Stockholm Protocol, in 18 BULLETIN OF 
THE COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. 91, 91 (1971) (quotation marks omitted). 
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not done so.27 And there is nothing in the current international 
economic environment that suggests that radical reforms to 
Berne would be any more likely today than in the 1960s.28 Hence, 
and as the subsequent analysis also tries to demonstrate, it is in 
the interests of countries of the South that Berne be repealed and 
a new framework be established on radically different grounds. 
Before proceeding, a brief background is needed on three 
relevant trade, legal, and economic development issues: 
A. International Trade in Copyrighted Works 
In the current conjuncture, it is impossible to provide 
accurate figures on the dollar value of the international trade in 
copyrighted materials, and for the particular purposes of this 
Essay, on the value of the flow (or the aggregated transactions) 
between developed countries and countries of the South. 
Certainly numerous studies have found that industrialised 
countries are the main beneficiaries of intellectual property 
rights.29 As the World Bank recently concluded, the TRIPS 
agreement, which incorporated much of Berne, “decidedly shifted 
the global rules of the game in favor” of rich countries.30 Without 
doubt as well, countries of the South are primarily users of 
copyrighted works. But the paucity of data gives us only a rough 
approximation of the specifics of the sales and licensing figures 
for the copyrighted materials at stake; moreover, there are 
certain conflicts in the statistics that do exist. According to 1999 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures on the global trade in 
royalties and licenses (derived primarily, though not exclusively, 
from intellectual property rights transactions), the United States 
received a total of $36.9 billion from its global intellectual 
property exports.31 Overall, the U.S. net surplus in its intellectual 
                                                          
 27. Refer to notes 117–25 infra (discussing copyright as an ideology exported to the 
South). 
 28. For example, in commenting on the quite mild reforms to copyright contained in 
the Stockholm Protocol of 1967, Sir Alan Herbert, Chairman of the British Copyright 
Council, labelled the Protocol “a delayed action bomb of dangerous principle into the 
flagship of copyright; a tunnel under the walls of the copyright fortress.” Johnson, supra 
note 26, at 180 (quotation marks omitted). Today, strengthening rather than limiting or 
qualifying global intellectual property protection is a central aim of governments and 
rights holders in the rich developed world, with the conflict over access to certain 
pharmaceutical products being an atypical exception. 
 29. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 129, 133 (2002) [hereinafter WORLD BANK] (showing that the United States, 
Japan, Germany, and France benefit the most from patent rents). 
 30. Id. at 129. 
 31. 55 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS STATISTICS 
YEARBOOK tbl.1 (2002). 
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property trade with other countries was more than $23 billion.32 
The United Kingdom, which was second to the United States, 
was the only other country to have an export-import surplus, but 
it trailed far behind with a surplus of $900 million. No country of 
the South had a surplus and, in fact, not a single one of the fifty 
least-developed countries had any calculable intellectual property 
revenues whatsoever. 
The above statistics do not, however, distinguish between 
the revenues generated from copyright, patent, trademark, and 
other forms of intellectual property. In the case of the United 
States, what are sometimes labelled the “core copyright 
industries”33 had total foreign sales and exports in 2001 of $88.97 
billion, according to one report; this represented an increase, in 
times of overall economic recession, of 9.4% over 1999 levels and 
meant that U.S. foreign copyright sales and exports exceeded 
those for important U.S. sectors such as chemicals and allied 
products and motor vehicles and parts.34 These industry-
calculated copyright statistics are more than double IMF figures 
for U.S. exports of all forms of intellectual property, although the 
former statistics do include sales as well as licence and royalty 
payments. There is, however, another limitation in the existing 
data; the particular countries which have purchased or licensed 
U.S.-produced copyrighted materials are not specified. Despite 
these limitations in the statistics, it does seem reasonable to 
draw two broad conclusions. First, because of much higher per 
capita income levels, most copyright-related transactions occur, 
at present, between and among richer countries, with the United 
States being the main producer, seller, and beneficiary. Second, 
countries of the South—generally and especially countries with 
large populations, such as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and 
Nigeria—offer huge potential markets for the copyright 
properties of the rich countries.35 In other words, there is a very 
                                                          
 32. Id. 
 33. See Stephen E. Siwek, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2002 
REPORT 3 n.1 (2002), available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2002_SIWEK_FULL.pdf. These 
U.S. industries include ones that create copyrighted materials as their primary products: 
the motion picture industry (television, theatrical, and home video), the recording 
industry (records, tapes, and CDs), the music publishing industry, the book, journal, and 
newspaper publishing industry, all branches of the computer software industry, 
legitimate theatre, advertising, and the radio, television and cable broadcasting 
industries. Id. 
 34. Id. at 4–5. In terms of estimated 2001 revenues, two of the largest U.S. 
copyright export sectors were computer software ($60.74 billion) and motion pictures 
($14.69 billion). Id. at 17. 
 35. According to a recent study of world population trends, “[t]he growth of human 
population has been, is now, and in the future will be almost entirely determined in the 
world’s less developed countries . . . . Ninety-nine percent of global natural increase—the 
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large financial incentive for corporate interests in rich countries, 
especially the United States, to try to require countries of the 
South to provide the strongest possible protection to copyright-
protected products within their own borders: the products 
protected will primarily be of U.S. origin and ownership. 
B. Basics of the Berne Requirements and Their Implications for 
Countries of the South 
Under the membership terms of the Berne Convention (and 
as strengthened by TRIPS), all signatories, including countries of 
the South, must agree to establish and enforce, within their own 
borders, certain minimum standards of copyright protection—
recognised to be highly restrictive of public use and to contain the 
“strong authors’ bias that is the Grundnorm of Berne”36— for all 
works of foreign nationals.37 What further needs to be 
                                                          
difference between numbers of births and numbers of deaths—now occurs in the 
developing regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America.” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
ECONOMICS, AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, IB/98-4, WORLD 
POPULATION AT A GLANCE: 1998 AND BEYOND (1999), available at http://www.census. 
gov/ipc/prod/wp98/ib98-4.pdf. 
 36. Ricketson, Boundaries of Copyright, supra note 25, at 93. “Authors’ rights 
therefore remain at the centre of the international framework.” Id. at 94. 
 37. Berne, supra note 7, art. 5. For more on this issue, refer to Part II infra, 
discussing national treatment. 
  Technically, a signatory need not apply Berne’s substantive minima to works 
created within its borders by citizens of the member nation itself.  See ROBERT P. MERGES 
ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 518 (3d ed. 2003). 
Foreign nationals are entitled to the minima or to the protections accorded the signatory’s 
own nationals, whichever protections are greater. Id. at 517–18. But, in theory and so 
long as foreign nationals are afforded at least the substantive minima, the signatory can 
accord different and lesser rights to its own citizens. See id. at 518. A leading example 
(although there are few) is the U.S. decision to maintain certain of its copyright 
formalities (such as registration), even after joining Berne in 1989. See id. 
 In practice and within any given signatory nation, both administrative 
convenience and internal and external political pressures normally will counsel 
conforming the protections afforded to signatory nationals to those accorded foreign 
nationals, whether those protections be Berne minima or even stronger protections, such 
as the current E.U./U.S. life plus seventy years term of protection: 
[Articles 5(2), 6bis, 7, 8, 9, 11, 11bis, 11ter, 12, 13, 14 and 14ter] comprise a basic 
corpus of authors’ rights, and have the consequence that there is a minimum 
level of protection that is uniformly available to authors in all countries of the 
Union other than the country of origin of their works.  In practice, however, 
these rights will almost always overlap with the protection already accorded 
through the application of national treatment.  This is because each Union 
country will usually accord the same rights to its own nationals, and will 
therefore grant identical protection both to its own authors and to Union 
authors.  The “rights specially granted” by the Convention will therefore not 
apply separately to Union authors, but will have the effect of defining the 
central content or core of the protection which the latter will receive under the 
principle of national treatment.  Accordingly, it will only be in the marginal area 
beyond this “central core” that differences in the level of protection accorded to 
Union authors will arise.  Nevertheless, even here the differences will be within 
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appreciated (and here the differences with patents are 
particularly marked) is that national standards (or criteria) for 
subsistence of copyright are generally low;38 that there are no 
formalities for the acquisition of protection; that the term or 
duration of copyright protection is already long (Berne 
establishes a minimum term for authorial works of life of the 
author plus fifty years); and that the term in the two largest 
copyright producing areas, the United States and Europe, has 
become even longer in the past decade.39 The result: In general, 
when the Berne/TRIPS tandem is implemented, all authorial 
copyright-protected works produced in rich, industrialised 
countries are automatically protected as intangible property 
rights in all countries of the South for a period extending to life of 
the author plus fifty years.40 (More recently, the U.S. began a new 
copyright offensive, what we might call its bilateral “Berne Plus” 
agenda,41 aimed at pressuring countries of the South to exceed 
the Berne minimum of life plus fifty years and to mirror the 
U.S./E.U. duration standard of life plus seventy years; in October 
of 2002, Taiwan rejected the U.S. call to extend its copyright 
duration, which is currently the Berne standard.)42 
Remembering what the legal realists taught us about 
property, copyright as a property right expresses a power relation 
                                                          
a relatively small compass, because of the need to place some limitations on the 
scope of application of the principle of national treatment. 
RICKETSON, supra note 7, at 206. 
  Because the practice of making uniform, within a country of origin, the rights 
available to all authors, whether citizens or foreign nationals, represents the “path of 
least resistance” for Berne signatories and is thus pervasive, I will assume the existence 
of such “least resistance” uniformity, based on the adoption of Berne minima for all 
authors whether foreign or domestic, hereafter throughout this Essay.  
 38. For example, the de minimus rule articulated in a U.K. case such as Exxon 
Corp. v. Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 69 (Eng. C.A.) 
(declaring that the single word Exxon is not an “original literary work” and hence not 
protected by copyright), is one of the few restrictions on copyrightability in the U.K. 
 39. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b), 112 
Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302) (extending copyright protection 
an additional 20 years); Council Directive, art. 1, 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 
Harmonising the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 1993 O.J. 
(L 290) 9 (extending the copyright term to life of the author plus seventy years). 
 40. As is well known, there are certain exceptions to the copyright property right, 
such as “fair dealing” and “fair use.” See Jane Ginsburg, Berne Without Borders: 
Geographic Indiscretion and Digital Communications, 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 111, 115 (2002) 
(noting Berne’s deference to “local policy”); Ricketson, Boundaries of Copyright, supra note 
25, at 88, 91 (stating that Berne can be read to include fair dealing and fair use). 
 41. Some NGOs have labelled U.S. and European efforts to establish bilateral I.P. 
relationships with other countries based on standards beyond those required by TRIPS as 
a “TRIPS PLUS” agenda. 
 42. Lawrence Lessig, Time to End the Race for Ever-Longer Copyright, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Oct. 17, 2002, at 21 (describing Taiwan’s rejection of the U.S. demands as 
courageous). 
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between persons (in this case, between the owners and actual or 
potential users of copyrighted works) and represents not only the 
state’s grant of sovereignty to a private person, but also power 
over people.43 Moreover, property not only represents power and 
financial relations in the present, but also “determines what men 
[and women] shall acquire”44 in coming years and decades. The 
basics of the copyright relationship between rich and poor 
nations now begin to emerge more clearly: In becoming 
signatories to Berne, countries of the South, which are primarily 
copyright users, have not only become further oppressed by the 
copyright power and control, financial and otherwise, exercised 
by rich countries in the present circumstance; such relationships 
and the agreement of poor countries to protect and enforce 
copyright in, for example, educational works of every description, 
until, at a minimum, fifty years after their authors die, has—and 
will have—truly monumental effects on those countries’ economic 
futures for decades, as well as their future use of materials. One 
of the aims of this Essay is to flesh out how this wide-ranging 
process works, uncover some of the baseline assumptions behind 
it, and decide whether this system is justified.45 
C. Copyright as a Vehicle for “Development” in Countries of the 
South 
Proponents of Berne and TRIPS values may suggest that the 
above views take a too one-sided and negative approach to 
copyright issues in countries of the South. Especially since the 
establishment of TRIPS in 1995, numerous public 
pronouncements and policy statements, as well as a growing 
catalogue of legal and economic scholarship, have argued that the 
spread of Western-style intellectual property values and regimes, 
                                                          
 43. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 29 (1927) 
(concluding that property law “confer[s] sovereign power on our captains of industry and 
even more so on our captains of finance”). 
 44. Id. at 13. Cohen based this “future distributions” insight on the ownership of 
land and machinery, but it works equally well in the case of intellectual property. In fact, 
given the economics of the licensing of I.P. (that is, most licensing income goes straight to 
a company’s “bottom line” without further investment or expenditure), ownership of 
copyright is even more determinative of future acquisitions than ownership of machinery. 
For example, the lyrics to the song Happy Birthday to You (written in 1893, copyrighted 
in 1935, expiration date of 2021) have already earned copyright royalties of £UK 39m, and 
the lyrics still have nearly another twenty years to go as an earner for Warner 
Communications, the current owner. See generally Julie Salamon, On the Other Hand, 
You Can Blow Out the Candles for Free, WALL ST. J., June 12, 1981, at A1 (discussing the 
history of the popular, copyrighted song). 
 45. On the need to justify property and property relations, see C.B. MACPHERSON, 
PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 11 (1978) (noting that property is 
controversial because it subserves the dominant classes of a society). 
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including enforcement systems, will create significant economic 
and wider developmental benefits for countries of the South. To 
date, most of this effort has concentrated on the supposedly 
positive economic effects of patents on the short- and long-term 
economic development of such countries; it is, however, beyond 
the remit of this Essay to discuss how a developed patent system 
might—or might not—act as a catalyst for economic take-off and 
sustained growth.  
Much less has been written about how the transplantation of 
what we might call a “mature Western-style copyright regime” 
and its infrastructure46 would generate significant economic 
growth in the South. Moreover, most of what has been written is 
neither convincing nor comprehensive and, to understate the 
point, contains gaping analytic holes. For example, a twenty-one 
page chapter in a recent World Bank assessment of intellectual 
property rights and countries of the South devotes but a single 
paragraph to the potential growth prospects that expanded 
copyright protection might open up for such countries.47 Indeed, 
one very much gets the feeling from reading this study that its 
authors decided that they had to say something about copyright 
and economic development. Some of the case studies they chose—
for example, how expanded copyright protection in neighbouring 
countries could assist the export prospects of Lebanon’s film and 
television industry48—are highly particular and difficult to 
generalise. Another example cited—how the establishment of 
professional collecting societies in Jamaica and Senegal might 
provide incentives for local musicians to record their music—
overlooks the critical point that collecting societies and rights 
organizations, even in such more developed countries as South 
Africa, act principally as revenue collectors for foreign rights 
holders;49 indeed a significant percentage of royalties are paid out 
                                                          
 46. Among the elements of a “mature Western-style copyright regime” are the 
following: a set of sophisticated and regularly updated copyright statutes and a 
supporting interpretative jurisprudence, a specialised court with enforcement procedures, 
knowledgeable appellate courts, a specialised bar, government promotion of copyright 
values, wider community respect for copyright and its orientation to cultural production, 
and the establishment of collecting societies and rights organizations. 
 47. See WORLD BANK, supra note 29, at 135 (suggesting that increased copyright 
protection can induce investments in cultural industries). 
 48. Id. 
 49. For example, in 1999 the South African reprographic rights organisation 
DALRO distributed more than 2.5 times as much revenue (collected from South African 
users) to foreign rights holders as it distributed to domestic rights holders. See STORY 
CIPR, supra note 9, at 52–54 (criticizing the idea of exporting the model of reprographic 
rights organisations to lesser-developed countries in Africa). If a fully functioning and 
active reprographic rights organisation was established in a poorer African country with 
an even less developed domestic publishing industry than South Africa, the financial 
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in foreign currency. Other proposals, such as the World Bank’s 
recently proposed “Nashville in Africa” project, seem to be based 
more on cheerleading and emotive exhortation than serious 
economic projections. Launched at a World Bank seminar held in 
Washington in June of 2001, this project, noting that the music 
industry was currently not “a significant money earner” in any 
African country, argued that the multi-billion dollar country 
music industry in Nashville, Tennessee, provided an economic 
model worth copying in Senegal, Ghana, and other African 
countries.50 As a senior World Bank official explained it: 
You only need one or two real successes—you only need a 
Nashville—and you have transformed the export structure 
of an economy [of most African states] away from primary 
commodity dependence, and that will have major effects. 
 . . . . 
 . . . The Nashville example is potent here in showing 
how a poor locality can be turned around. That is the sort of 
thing that can capture the politicians’ imagination.51 
The supposed parallels drawn between Nashville, 
Tennessee, and, say, country music legends such as Conway 
Twitty or Tammy Wynette, and, Dakar, Senegal, and some of its 
best musicians, are not, however, the sort of thing that would 
capture the imagination of many developmental economists.52 Not 
only is this an intellectually embarrassing attempt at cross-
cultural and cross-geographic transplantation, it also fails to 
appreciate that the slight possibility of a few Senegalese 
musicians making a few extra dollars in music royalties through 
copyright earnings must be weighed against the millions of 
dollars of annual extra earnings and royalties in Senegal that 
would be taken in by Microsoft, any number of Hollywood 
studios, the five dominant global recording companies, and other 
producers of copyright-protected works, if that African country 
(and similar countries) operated a regime that strictly enforced 
foreign copyrights and paid all royalties. 
Two other telling historical realities are also overlooked in 
                                                          
disparity regarding collections destined for foreign versus domestic rights holders would 
likely be even more pronounced. 
 50. See The World Bank Group, Workshop on the Development of the Music Industry 
in Africa (June 20–21, 2001), at http://www.worldbank.org/research/trade/africa_ 
music2.htm. 
 51. Id. (quoting Paul Collier, Director of the World Bank’s Development Research 
Department). 
 52. For a brief critique of the World Bank’s “Nashville in Africa” proposal, see 
STORY CIPR, supra note 9, at 12–13. 
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the current rush, chiefly promoted by WIPO, to install new 
copyright regimes in countries of the South. On the one hand, a 
number of the world’s least developed countries became 
signatories to the Berne Convention more than twenty-five years 
ago (e.g., Benin 1961, Chad 1971), and yet none have seen 
significant increases in their publishing industries or the level of 
copyright-protected works in subsequent decades. On the other 
hand, and here citing an often-mentioned case, the United States 
did not recognise foreign copyrights for more than one hundred 
years after it was founded, based on the thoroughly 
understandable logic that the enforcement of foreign-held 
copyrights would primarily benefit non-U.S. rights holders and 
that it was better, as a then-developing country, to borrow 
without permission.53 
In summary, the fundamental weakness of most of the 
copyright-based economic development projects proposed for the 
South is that they concentrate solely on the potential revenues 
that a more developed copyright system would or could bring 
either to a particular country or a particular group of creators. 
They neglect to mention that stricter enforcement of copyright 
will also mean significant costs for most such countries in a wide 
range of other copyright-protected products and sectors. Such 
studies are similar to a company business plan that only looks at 
potential revenues and ignores fixed and variable costs. So a 
positive and convincing argument that shows how expanded 
copyright protection will generate significant economic 
development in poorer countries of the South remains to be 
made. 
II. NATIONAL TREATMENT: A CONTESTED EQUALITY ISSUE 
Twenty years ago, Stephen Stewart concluded that “the 
principle of national treatment . . . has proved itself as the 
fundamental principle of copyright and neighbouring rights 
conventions for nearly a century.”54 A recent WTO dispute panel 
                                                          
 53. William Patry, The United States and International Copyright Law: From Berne 
to Eldred, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 749 (2003) (noting that not enforcing copyrights gave the 
American public inexpensive editions of the best British books). 
 54. STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 
42 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis added) (restating a conclusion printed in his 1983 first 
edition); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23, at 72 (discussing the “pervasiveness” of the 
principle of national treatment in Berne, as evidenced by the fact that there are only 
three exceptions to national treatment in Berne); Ginsburg, supra note 40, at 114–15 
(stating that the “border-preserving rule of national treatment remains the cornerstone of 
Berne and its successor agreements”); Ricketson, Future of Intellectual Property, supra 
note 18, at 875 (suggesting that national treatment provides “the basis” of Berne, as well 
as of the Paris Convention). 
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took a similar view as to the centrality of the notion of national 
treatment for international copyright relations.55 Sometimes 
labeled the principle of assimilation, national treatment means 
“the complete assimilation [for copyright purposes] of foreigners 
to nationals”56 and has been defined as “a rule of 
nondiscrimination, promising foreign creators who come within 
[a] treaty’s protection that they will enjoy the same treatment for 
their creations in the protecting country as the protecting 
country gives to its own nationals.”57 
First proclaimed at an 1878 authors’ conference that 
preceded Berne, national treatment became a key feature not 
only of Berne itself, but also of subsequent international 
intellectual property treaties and agreements, such as the TRIPS 
Agreement.58 The supposed “common sense” legal view sees 
national treatment as not only reducing conflict-of-laws issues, a 
traditional bug-bear of international law, but also as allowing 
judges in each country to rule on all “similar” issues, whether 
involving foreign nationals or the country’s own citizens, by 
implementing the same, familiar “domestic” law. As for the 
philosophical or political justification, national treatment is 
viewed as being “in accord with the ideal of international law 
that all men are equal before the law, regardless of whether they 
are nationals or foreigners.”59 Other leading English-language 
international copyright commentators, such as Goldstein (U.S.) 
and Ricketson (Australia), would no doubt endorse Stewart’s 
view that national treatment has proved to be “the only viable”60 
principle on which to base international copyright relations. And 
as we look to a future in which copyrighted materials will, with 
digitalisation and ever greater Internet use, become much more 
mobile than a decade ago and hurtle over national boundaries 
without respite, the notion of providing national treatment to 
copyrighted materials would seem to be even more efficient and 
fair to all concerned than in previous eras. 
Reduced to its basics, national treatment means equal 
treatment or equal protection by law of the copyrights to works 
                                                          
 55. See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States—Section 211 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶¶ 240–242, WTO Doc. WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002). 
 56. 1 STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND 
ARTISTIC PROPERTY 365 (1938). 
 57. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23, at 72. 
 58. See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 3 (stating that member nations shall treat each 
other equally “with regard to the protection of intellectual property”). 
 59. STEWART, supra note 54, at 38. 
 60. Id. 
STORYG3R.DOC 11/6/2003 8:01 PM 
778 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [40:3 
owned by nationals and nonnationals alike.61 And at the outset, it 
seems difficult to disagree with sentiments that mandate “equal 
treatment” and forbid “discrimination against nonnationals.” 
“Equality” is a central Enlightenment value; even the Bible 
appears to endorse the equality concept on which national 
treatment is based.62 In the case of copyright, would we want to 
endorse a country of the South giving preferential treatment to 
its own nationally-produced copyright works or treating words 
produced in the U.K., France, or the U.S., in a discriminatory 
fashion? Yet as adjudication of the meaning of the United States 
Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment and its Equal Protection 
Clause reveals, “equality” is a far from simple concept63 and “is 
shorthand for many values, some of which conflict with one 
another, and some of which conflict with other values such as 
freedom.”64 More than one legal philosopher has suggested that 
“equality” is a term devoid of content and which, because it 
“engenders profound conceptual confusion, . . . . should be 
banished from moral and legal discourse as an explanatory 
norm.”65 A brief examination of the scholarship on the meaning of 
equality in legal philosophy and the social sciences more 
generally,66 as well as in feminist67 and critical race theory 
scholarship, should tempt us from jumping to any quick 
conclusions as to whether “equal treatment”—or, in this case, 
national treatment—is in fact either a good or a straightforward 
                                                          
 61.  For a more complete explanation of the basic principles of national treatment, 
refer to note 37 supra. 
 62. The Old Testament book Leviticus contains the admonition: “one manner of law, 
as well for the stranger, as for one of your own country.” Maimon Schwarzschild, 
Constitutional Law and Equality, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 156, 157 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2001) (quoting Leviticus 24:22). 
 63. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 16 (2d ed. 1988) 
(discussing the expansions and complexities of equal protection in the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches of the U.S. government). 
 64. Schwarzschild, supra note 62, at 169. 
 65. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542 (1982). 
Another commentator has written: “Equality, in truth, might mean almost anything. The 
crucial questions are ‘who is to be equal to whom? With respect to what?’” Schwarzschild, 
supra note 62, at 156. 
 66. See, e.g., Felix E. Oppenheim, The Concept of Equality, in 5 INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 102 (David L. Sills ed., 1968) (“[T]he concept of 
equality refers sometimes to certain properties which men are held to have in common but 
more often to certain treatments which men either receive or ought to receive.”); 
Schwarzschild, supra note 62, at 156 (discussing different kinds of equality and how 
attempting equality can result in great inequalities); Westen, supra note 65, at 542 
(proposing that the transformation of “simple statements of rights into statements of 
equality not only involves unnecessary work but also engenders profound conceptual 
confusion”). 
 67. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
ch. 12 (1989). 
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thing in international copyright relationships. 
In the first place, providing national treatment to 
copyrighted works is not a matter of treating all people alike, but 
of treating all property alike (in this case, intangible property).68 
There are many garden-variety examples of when various forms 
of property are not treated alike; a graduated form of income tax 
would be an obvious case. As for the national treatment of people, 
discrimination based on nationality (or citizenship or place of 
birth) is commonplace. Only American citizens can vote for their 
president, and their president must be “a natural born Citizen” to 
be eligible for office.69 Immigration laws in jurisdictions across 
the globe are based, almost in their entirety, on discrimination 
against nonnationals. Even within a single country such as the 
U.S., individual states are allowed to establish certain 
restrictions for out-of-state users,70 and fees are much cheaper for 
in-state residents at state-funded universities than for out-of-
state students. In all of these cases and many others, other 
interests and values—such as placing a premium on 
citizenship—trump national treatment as a determining 
principle. 
But these are only preliminary matters designed to 
problematise the simplistic notions of national treatment that 
pass for allegedly self-evident truths in the literature produced 
by organizations such as WIPO. Two of the basic tenets of 
equality theory and the adjudication of equality claims are that 
“likes should be treated alike,” and conversely, “unalikes should 
not be treated alike.” Moreover, the consequences of not 
appreciating the distinctions between likes and unalikes can be 
severe and highly inequitable. As the U.S. Supreme Court 
concluded, “[s]ometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in 
treating things that are different as though they were exactly 
alike.”71  
Let’s examine a list of copyrightable works from the rich 
countries of the North and poorer countries of the South to 
determine exactly how alike and how unalike they are from each 
other. In the area of software, first on this list we could put 
Windows 2000 produced by Microsoft versus a bespoke program 
to schedule patients used by a hospital in Lima, Peru. In 
                                                          
 68. I will ignore potential objections from supporters of droit d’auteur systems that 
a copyrighted work expresses—indeed encapsulates—the personality or will of its creator. 
 69. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 5. 
 70. See TRIBE, supra note 63, at 417–26 (identifying allowed restrictions on access 
to local transportation facilities and scarce local resources or commodities by out-of-state 
users). 
 71. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971). 
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cinematic production, we have the summer of 2003’s predicted 
blockbuster, the $150 million movie The Hulk from Universal 
Studios, versus a “small story” movie directed by an independent 
Nigerian filmmaker. In books, we have the latest Harry Potter 
door-stopping epic from J.K. Rowling versus a slim book of Urdu 
poetry from India. In music, we have a new CD from Canadian 
pop singer Celine Dion versus a CD just released by a sega singer 
from Mauritius. Yes, there is a certain “alikeness” about both 
lists of works; they are, respectively, software, films or cinematic 
works, literary works, and music, and all are protected by 
copyright. But beyond the surface similarity of being similar 
types or forms of work, all of these works and their respective 
rights holders (and especially their respective positions in the 
global power hierarchy) are, in fact, far more “unalike” than they 
are alike. Yet, because all of the above countries of the South are 
members of the WTO and signatories of TRIPS and Berne, they 
all are required by the principle of “least resistance” uniformity72 
to ensure that nonnational—and essentially unalike—works 
receive the same protection as the very dissimilar works of their 
own nationals. But what is the policy basis for this requirement? 
Surely it cannot be the promotion of equality given the 
unalikeness of the works described above and the unalikeness of 
the countries and rights holders involved. 
To demonstrate the various dimensions of this 
“unalikeness,” we could play with these actuals and hypotheticals 
at length. Here are but a few essentially rhetorical questions we 
could ask: Do the foreign works actually need equal treatment in 
countries of the South with the locally produced works? Are the 
consequences the same if they do not receive it? In the case of an 
alleged infringement occurring in the U.S. or Mauritius, does the 
recording company behind Dion have an equal ability to launch 
and succeed in an infringement action in either country as does 
the Mauritian sega singer?73 In the same vein, do the 
governments of the U.S. and Mauritius have equal abilities or 
possibilities to mobilise the TRIPS and WTO enforcement 
procedures with a claim that the other country is not respecting 
Berne’s national treatment principles? Does Rowling’s story have 
the same cultural meaning in the U.K. as the meaning that the 
Urdu poems have in India? And have they both been produced for 
the same reasons and in even roughly similar or equal 
                                                          
 72.  Refer to note 37 supra. 
 73. In the litigation schema drawn up by Marc Galanter, the recording studio would 
be a “repeat player” and the Mauritian singer would be a “one-shotter.” Marc Galanter, 
Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 10 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974). 
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circumstances? Is it likely that the Nigerian film will get billing 
equal with The Hulk in Los Angeles movie theaters, let alone 
those in Lagos? And do filmmakers in the two countries have 
equality in their opportunities to make films? Given the world-
wide use of Windows and the related “network externalities”74 
that accompany this pervasiveness, do the two computer 
programs have equivalent computing impact, are they equal 
competitors, and would the revenues lost as a result of an 
unauthorised use of Windows have an equal effect on Microsoft 
as the unauthorised use of the Peruvian hospital computer 
program? In the same vein, could you not achieve an egalitarian 
result if, for a literacy campaign in India, you distributed an 
unauthorised (i.e., translated without permission) and 
uncompensated Harry Potter segment to illiterate persons—in 
order to learn to read, a person needs some material to read—but 
concluded that the use of an unauthorised photocopy of the Urdu 
poems for the same campaign would be unfair?75 (That is, 
seemingly nonegalitarian rules of allotment can be justified if 
they result in more equal satisfaction of certain basic human 
needs, such as the need to be literate.)76 We could carry on asking 
these questions, but I hope the main point has been made: In 
almost all cases, the characteristics of the works produced in 
countries of the South are, to borrow a well-known phrase from 
U.S. equal protection jurisprudence, “differently situated” from 
works produced in rich industrialised countries. Their 
substantive differences trump their surface similarities in form. 
As a matter of policy and of equity, neither equal nor national 
treatment is mandated. 
In essence, what international copyright regimes attempt to 
do is reduce and homogenise all forms of cultural production to a 
single, one-dimensional property phenomenon, that is, to a 
capitalist commodity, and then proclaim the essential equality of 
all commodities in the global marketplace; all other aspects or 
                                                          
 74. See MERGES, supra note 37, at 856–60.  
 75. It is far from certain that the use of materials for teaching purposes outside of 
normal state and private educational institutions is permitted by Berne. As to the 
meaning of Berne’s Article 10(2) words “‘by way of illustration’ for . . . ‘teaching,’” 
Ricketson comments that an official committee report from the 1967 Stockholm 
Conference on Berne took “a restrictive interpretation, as it clearly excludes the 
utilisation of works in adult education courses which are very popular in many countries,” 
and that in “developing countries, it would also exclude adult literacy campaigns.” 
RICKETSON, supra note 7, at 497–98 (footnote omitted). As Morris Ginsberg explains, to be 
egalitarian, a “difference of treatment [in this case, between local and multinational 
publishers] requires justification in terms of relevant and sufficient differences between 
the claimants.” MORRIS GINSBERG, ON JUSTICE IN SOCIETY 79 (1965). 
 76. See Oppenheim, supra note 66, at 105. 
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characteristics of such production are neglected, indeed 
suppressed. Let me explain. A basic contradiction lying behind 
national treatment, at least as implemented to treat works of 
foreign nationals and the country of origin’s own citizens equally, 
is the assumption that it does not matter under what conditions 
a copyrighted work is produced or the particular conditions under 
which it is to be used. Under national treatment as implemented 
under the principle of “least resistance” uniformity, the film The 
Hulk is treated in Nigeria “as if” it were made in Nigeria and a 
U.S.- or British-produced nursing textbook is treated in 
Zimbabwe “as if” it were researched, written, and printed by a 
Zimbabwean. But it is precisely the fact that the works are 
produced in radically different circumstances that goes to the 
very nature of their respective power as intellectual properties. 
To act, both for purposes of protection and for the determination 
of users’ rights, “as if” powerful and pervasive copyrighted works 
such as Word or the Hollywood blockbuster were created and 
produced in Zimbabwe, Malawi, or Zambia, is to collapse the very 
relevant distinction between three of the poorest sub-Saharan 
African countries and the richest country in the world. It also 
collapses the reasons why such works have, in the current 
circumstances, been produced in one country and not the other.  
In 1886, when Berne was established, all of its leading 
signatories, such as Britain, France, and Germany, were at 
roughly equal stages of economic development.77 And during the 
“crisis of international copyright” in the 1960s, one British 
publisher did speak with a certain honesty and forthrightness 
when he stated: “‘The Berne Convention is an instrument 
primarily designed to meet the needs of countries which have 
reached a certain stage of development.’”78 In Berne’s initial 
stages when it was essentially a regional agreement among 
relative equals, we can say that the “as if” contradictions were 
much more muted, and that it may have made a certain sense to 
treat, for example, a British work in Germany “as if” that work 
had been produced in Germany. There was, in other words, a 
certain sense of valid reciprocal protection between equally-
situated nations. But today, in the case of a British-produced 
work exported to (or used) in its former colony of Nigeria, that 
same logic does not hold, either in the context of production and 
distribution of copyrighted works or in their use and exploitation 
                                                          
 77. Two of the original 1886 signatories, Haiti and Tunisia, were not, relatively 
speaking, rich and more developed countries. 
 78. See Johnson, supra note 26, at 143 (quoting Observations of Governments on 
the Proposals for Revising the Substantive Copyright Provisions (Doc. S/1), BIRPI Doc. 
S/13 at 103 (1967)). 
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within Nigeria. 
In fact, Berne does not actually mandate that a copyrighted 
work should be exploited or that exemptions should be permitted 
on the basis of national treatment. Instead, a series of override 
clauses in Berne state that any statutory exemptions or 
limitations can only be created “in certain special cases,” that 
they must “not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work,” 
and must “not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the author” (the so-called “three-step” test).79 It is uncertain 
precisely what these phrases mean in practice, and the 
commentators or treatise writers are of little assistance on this 
matter.80 Essentially, it can be argued (although the matter is 
hardly free from doubt) that the exceptions or exemptions to 
copyright (I do think the term “users’ rights” is preferable and 
more accurate) established by a country of the South must 
basically track the notion of “fair use” used in U.S. copyright 
jurisprudence, or that of “fair dealing” used in the U.K. or 
available in other European countries. In other words, the 
standard of what is considered “normal” can be claimed to be that 
which exists as “normal” in the U.S., the U.K., and a handful of 
other rich countries and “the ways in which an author might 
reasonably be expected to exploit his [or her] work in the normal 
course of events.”81 Countries of the South, however, have quite 
different traditions from those of the North, and their 
information needs and their ability both to access and pay for 
such information are radically disparate from that existing in 
rich countries. For example, is the “fairness” component of “fair 
dealing” the same in both Nigeria and the U.K. when, on the one 
hand, the information needs in schools are far greater in the 
former than the latter and, on the other, the resources to pay for 
access to such information are so much less? That is, what 
grounds, rooted in fairness and equality, should the Nigerian 
government feel pressured, in the name of national treatment 
                                                          
 79. Berne, supra note 7, art. 9(2); see also TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 13 (explaining 
that exceptions to exclusive rights shall be limited such that they “do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder”); WCT, supra note 16, art. 10 
(allowing nations to draft legislation that limits or creates exceptions to rights granted to 
authors only if such limitations and exceptions “do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author”). 
 80. See, e.g., RICKETSON, supra note 7, at 483 (suggesting a common sense 
interpretation of the phrase “normal exploitation” such that making a limited number of 
copies of a protected work for private study or for the purposes of a judicial proceeding 
would not conflict with the author’s “normal exploitation of a work,” but that 
photocopying a very large number of documents for a particular purpose, or for “industrial 
undertakings,” would violate rights reserved to the author). 
 81. Id. 
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and uniform minima, to treat works produced by its own writers 
on the same basis as works produced by nonnational authors?82 
Certainly we can state with confidence—and admittedly with a 
trace of sarcasm—that the architects of the TRIPS Agreement 
did not intend that the term “normal exploitation” would mean, 
in the South, that software should be treated as it currently and 
normally is in the poorer countries of the South; according to the 
Business Software Alliance, the “normal use” of software in many 
such countries is unauthorised (i.e., pirated) use.83 
From the analysis above, we can draw two basic conclusions. 
First, it is incoherent to argue that countries of the South must, 
for copyright purposes, recognise within their own borders the 
formal legal equality of all cultural and artistic creations 
produced across the globe when, on so many other dimensions, 
there is extreme inequality and disparity in the conditions of 
production and use across the globe. Second, national treatment 
does not work in the interests of countries of the South but 
rather reinforces the power of rich industrialised countries and 
their rights holders. Laws mandating national treatment may 
encourage formal equality, but reproduce substantive 
inequality.84 Indeed, it is the private intellectual property rights 
of the richest nations and richest rights holders that are one of 
the leading sources of the current inequality between rich and 
poor nations. It is in the very act of upholding and enforcing 
these private property rights that these inequalities are 
deepened. If, as Macaulay argued in his famous speech on 
copyright duration more than one hundred and sixty years ago, 
that copyright is “a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a 
                                                          
 82. Databases provide another example, at least insofar as the literary or artistic 
works they may contain are protected by Berne (although the databases, qua databases, 
technically are not). Why should two databases, one produced in the U.S. and the other 
one in Nigeria, be treated alike within Nigeria? Given the radically different income levels 
within the two countries, the far different possibilities of obtaining research funding, and 
the fact that Nigerian researchers are much less likely to be able to find alternative data 
sources or be able to generate their own data compared to their colleagues in richer 
countries, why should we require the same conditions of access or the same costs of access 
for all researchers? 
 83. See, e.g., BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, EIGHTH ANNUAL BSA GLOBAL 
SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY: TRENDS IN SOFTWARE PIRACY 1994–2002, at 6 (2003), available 
at http://global.bsa.org/globalstudy/2003_GSPS.pdf (claiming that in 2002, ninety-two 
percent of the software used in China (the world’s most populous nation) was pirated 
software, indicating that normal exploitation was unauthorised exploitation). 
 84. Speaking about the conditions existing in Paris in 1894, Anatole France wrote, 
in his well-known phrase, that it is “the majestic equality of the laws, which forbid rich 
and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.” 
ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (Winifred Stephens trans., 1930) (suggesting that if 
“unalikes” face equally enforced laws, enforcing laws that go to the very nature of their 
“unalikeness” or difference result not in equality but substantive inequality). 
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bounty to writers”85 (and to publishers we can add), there can be 
no fairness in a requirement that poor countries of the South and 
their users must, in the guise of equal or national treatment, pay 
the same bounty and same level of taxation to rights holders—
primarily corporate interests located in rich industrialised 
countries—as users in these rich countries are required to pay. 
Nor should the “fairness” of “fair use” or “fair dealing” be 
calculated on an equivalent scale. 
III. INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: AN UNBALANCED AND 
“UNBALANCEABLE” SYSTEM 
Nearly all discourses use metaphors. Within the discourse of 
copyright law, especially its American variant, no metaphor is 
more prevalent or seemingly evocative than that which suggests 
copyright jurisprudence is a system that aims to—or, in fact, 
actually does—balance the rights of authors or right holders, on 
the one hand, and of copyright users and the wider society on the 
other.86 This notion of copyright as a balancing and balanceable 
                                                          
 85. Thomas Babington Macaulay, A Speech Delivered in the House of Commons on 
the 5th of February 1841 (complaining that copyright laws tax innocent human pleasures 
while failing to proportionally increase the material available for learning), available at 
http://www.yarchive.net/macaulay/copyright.html. 
 86. I have not attempted here to provide one of those encyclopaedic citations (for 
which U.S. law reviews are famous or infamous) as to the widespread use of the word 
“balanced” or “balancing” in copyright jurisprudence and legal commentary. Rather, the 
references here are meant as illustrative of the range of sources where the balancing 
metaphor is used. (1) U.S. law: See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) 
(“[T]he Copyright Act . . . creates a balance between the artist’s right to control the work 
during the term of the copyright protection and the public’s need for access to creative 
works.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).  
Because this task involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors 
and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on 
the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, 
information, and commerce on the other hand, our patent and copyright statutes 
have been amended repeatedly. 
Id. (2) U.K. law: See, e.g., Ashdown v. Tel. Group Ltd., [2002] Ch. 149, 153. (Eng. C.A.) 
(“On any fair or proper balance between the demands of the community and the 
fundamental rights of the individual, unlicensed exploitation of property without 
compensation could not be considered to be in the public interest . . . .”). (3) U.S. 
“mainstream” legal commentary on copyright theory: See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, The 
Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP 159, 
160 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994) (“Proper construction of our copyright 
law therefore depends on striking a socially acceptable balance between the interests of 
authors and the public.”). (4) European legal commentary on the E.U. Database Directive: 
See, e.g., Jens L. Gaster, The EU Council of Ministers’ Common Position Concerning the 
Legal Protection of Databases: A First Comment, 6 ENT. L. REV. 258, 262 (1995) (“[T]he 
Common Position is intended to create a balance between the interests of database 
manufacturers, operators, users, authors, competitors, SMEs and society at large.”). 
(5) Critics of intellectual property overprotection: IP Justice, New at IPJ, at 
http://www.ipjustice.org (last visited Sept. 13, 2003) (identifying the recently formed 
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system has a long lineage. For example, the words that the 
British judge Lord Mansfield spoke more than two hundred years 
ago in the early copyright case of Sayre v. Moore are still cited 
today by courts operating in the digital and database era: 
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally 
prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed 
their time for the service of the community, may not be 
deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their 
ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be 
deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be 
retarded.87 
But if this admonition to avoid “two extremes” is one of the 
foundational sources for the balancing metaphor itself, we should 
be aware that the same Lord Mansfield also gave us the warning 
that “nothing in law is so apt to mislead as a metaphor.”88 A 
contemporary version of a somewhat similar sentiment suggests 
that “metaphor is the rhetorical process by which discourse 
unleashes the power that certain fictions have to redescribe 
reality.”89 
                                                          
campaigning and advocacy group, IP Justice, as “an international civil liberties 
organization that promotes balanced intellectual property law in a digital world”). (6) A 
Nobel Prize winning economist writing on TRIPS: JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND 
ITS DISCONTENTS 8 (2002) (“[T]he underlying problems—the fact that the intellectual 
property regime established under the Uruguay Round was not balanced . . . remain.”). 
 87. Sayre v. Moore (1785) (Lord Mansfield, C.J.), quoted in Cary v. Longman, 102 
Eng. Rep. 138, 139 n.b (1801) (rationalising that ownership rights to materials such as 
sea charts should not prevent others from making alterations and corrections that render 
the materials more accurate, serviceable, and useful); see also New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS 
v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 597 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Sayre v. Moore to support 
denial of an action brought by copyright holders of an author’s works who sought to enjoin 
publication of the author’s biography). 
 88. Knox v. Gye, 5 L.R.-E. & I. App. 656, 676 (H.L. 1871) (attributing error in a case 
to the metaphoric use of the word “trustee”). In this same spirit, we can re-read Lord 
Mansfield’s quote from Sayre v. Moore. He speaks of providing a reward (copyright 
protection) to “men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the 
community.” Sayre, 102 Eng. Rep. at 140. We see here the vast stretch between self-
employed and community-oriented authors, composers, or artists of Mansfield’s time (who 
still exist today) producing genuinely cutting-edge works and, for example, a highly 
derivative new tweak to an existing computer program knocked out by a Microsoft 
programmer, the rights to which are owned by Bill Gates & Co. Both works are protected 
by copyright, but attempting to use the same justification for that protection is rather 
more difficult and misleading. As Justice Benjamin Cardozo warned, “[m]etaphors in law 
are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by 
enslaving it.” Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (rejecting the 
metaphor of a “parent” corporation acting through an “alias” or a “dummy” subsidiary in 
refusing to extend liability to the stockholder of a railroad company for injuries sustained 
by a passenger resulting from the negligence of a franchisee). 
 89. PAUL RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR 7 (Robert Czerny trans., 1977) 
(articulating the central theme of an hermeneutics study on the role of metaphors in 
poetic discourse). 
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Both in 1785 in Sayre v. Moore and today, the reality claim 
being unleashed is that the overall copyright regime and, most 
importantly, the rights of the two main respective parties, 
creators and users, can be best understood as existing in some 
type of equilibrium or balance. It is the task of legislators and 
courts who are, respectively, drafting and adjudicating copyright 
statutes and agreements, to ensure that this equilibrium is 
corrected when it occasionally gets “out of kilter,” off-centre, or 
unbalanced. In this section, I want to look at three issues: 
(1) from where does this balancing or equilibrium model for 
copyright arise?; (2) for countries of the South and their citizens, 
does the international copyright system operate as a balance?; 
and (3) is the balance metaphor a helpful and coherent one to use 
in trying to assess the role and practice of the international 
copyright system, and the Berne Convention in particular, vis-à-
vis countries of the South? More broadly, is copyright a 
balanceable system and, alternatively, does the widespread use 
of this balancing metaphor create an incoherent legal fiction? 
While the concept of equilibrium appears to be simple and 
straightforward, it is, in fact, “an elusive concept because it can 
be variously defined.”90 Cynthia Russett suggests that 
equilibrium “implies a state of balance or adjustment among a 
number of conflicting forces,” but it can also “refer to a process as 
well as a point” and “may be categorised as static or dynamic; as 
stable, neutral, or unstable.”91 Initially theorised within the 
confines of the natural and physical sciences, equilibrium has a 
rich intellectual and scholarly history, especially, though not 
exclusively, in the United States. Starting in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century, the 
concept of equilibrium gained further prominence as a leading 
descriptive and theoretical tool across a range of social science 
disciplines, including psychology and anthropology, political 
science (e.g., ideas of pluralism and interest group politics), 
international relations (e.g., balance of power studies), and 
particularly in sociology (e.g., structural functionalism and the 
work of Talcott Parsons) and economics (e.g., the concept of an 
equilibrium price and general and partial equilibrium models).92  
                                                          
 90. CYNTHIA EAGLE RUSSETT, THE CONCEPT OF EQUILIBRIUM IN AMERICAN SOCIAL 
THOUGHT 2 (1966). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See, e.g., John S. Chipman, The Nature and Meaning of Equilibrium in 
Economic Theory, in FUNCTIONALISM IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: THE STRENGTH AND LIMITS 
OF FUNCTIONALISM IN ANTHROPOLOGY, ECONOMICS, POLITICAL SCIENCE, AND SOCIOLOGY 
35, 36 (Don Martindale ed., 1965) (“Equilibrium—meaning a balance of opposing forces—
is a concept as fundamental in economics as it is in physics.”). Similar citations could be 
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Some social scientists employ notions of equilibrium merely 
in a descriptive sense, while others derive theoretical 
ramifications from its application.93 Within the field of law, the 
concepts of balance and equilibrium are also pervasive, 
sometimes being used more in a descriptive or metaphorical 
sense (e.g., the well-known scales of justice and blind-folded Lady 
Justice statues), and sometimes employed, as in some law and 
economics literature, for their purported theoretical insights and 
explanatory power. Again within the U.S. context, the noted legal 
educator and jurist Roscoe Pound is usually credited as being one 
of the first persons to stress the importance of balancing interests 
in the work of courts. In one of his best-known works, Pound 
wrote that courts should conduct “a reasoned weighing of the 
interests involved and a reasoned attempt to reconcile them or 
adjust them.”94 It is now commonplace to argue that the “broader 
convention of balancing competing interests . . . is—at least since 
Roscoe Pound’s seminal contribution—the predominant way of 
addressing legal questions.”95 So it should come as no surprise 
then that the concept of balancing and weighing interests has 
acquired a central place in copyright discourse as well. 
But in the context of international copyright relationships, 
especially between the rich nations of the North and the poor 
nations of the South, and within the existing terms and ideology 
of the Berne Convention itself, is it accurate to claim that the 
global copyright system is “balanced” or indeed “balanceable”? I 
suggest that it is not. While a full analysis of these questions is 
beyond the scope of this Essay, it is possible here to sketch out 
the basics of four initial reasons why the global copyright system 
does not, indeed cannot due to its current overriding premises, 
balance the interests of copyright owners, situated almost 
exclusively in rich industrialised countries, and users or potential 
users of copyright material in the countries of the South. 
First: The Berne Convention is known as a “minimum 
rights” treaty, meaning that all signatories must agree to 
establish national standards that do not, at least as to the works 
of foreign nationals, drop below certain internationally agreed 
                                                          
compiled about the importance of equilibrium in other social sciences, but such an effort 
would be beyond the scope of this Essay. 
 93. See, e.g., RUSSETT, supra note 90, at 8 (“I would not call a man an equilibrium 
theorist simply because he happens to let fall the term ‘equilibrium.’ . . . For one thing, 
the word has been used for centuries merely as a synonym for balance with no theoretical 
ramifications.”). 
 94. Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 35 (1943). 
 95. Hanoch Dagan, Qualitative Judgments and Social Criticism in Private Law: A 
Comment on Professor Keating, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 89, 94 (2003). 
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minimum levels, with concomitant pressures on signatories to 
apply such minima with respect to all authors.96 On the duration 
of protection, a country establishing a term of life of the author 
plus twenty-five years for domestic authors, with no special 
provision for foreign authors, would be in breach of Article 7 of 
Berne, as a life plus twenty-five year term is less than Berne’s 
minimum of life plus fifty years.97 On the subject matter to be 
protected, it would breach Article 2(1) if a signatory country 
decided that musical compositions or maps were categories of 
works that, if produced by foreign composers or cartographers, 
should no longer be protected by copyright or protected in a 
different manner from that which is specified.98 Article 9(1) of 
TRIPS also requires all WTO members to uphold these Berne 
articles, and those countries in alleged breach of Berne would 
also be in breach of Articles 1(1) and 9(1) of TRIPS. Yet neither 
Berne nor TRIPS sets any maximums for protection,99 that is, 
member countries are essentially allowed to establish copyright 
protection that is as extensive (for owners) and as restrictive (for 
users) as those countries wish. In the same vein, Berne sets no 
maximum period for the duration of protection,100 and new types 
of works, such as computer software, were protected by copyright 
in Berne Convention countries, such as the United Kingdom, 
during the 1980s, long before Berne/TRIPS specifically protected 
such works by copyright.101 The end results are that Berne is 
necessarily unbalanced, and that unless Berne is amended, 
which seems highly unlikely,102 the limits or sphere of protection 
                                                          
 96. Refer to note 37 supra (explaining the principle of “least resistance” uniformity). 
 97. Berne, supra note 7, art. 7. 
 98. Id. art. 2(1) (defining the expression “literary and artistic works” to include, 
inter alia, musical compositions and maps). The highly prescriptive section 1 declares that 
these works (and many others that are specifically enumerated) must be considered as 
“literary and artistic works.” Id. Section 6 states that “[t]he works mentioned in this 
Article shall enjoy protection in all countries of the [Berne] Union.” Id. art. 2(6). 
Exceptions are quite limited. For example, section 8 states that “[t]he protection of this 
Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the 
character of mere items of press information.” Id. art. 2(8). 
 99. Berne, supra note 7, art. 19 (stating that “[t]he provisions of this Convention 
shall not preclude the making of a claim to the benefit of any greater protection which may 
be granted by legislation in a country of the Union” (emphasis added)); TRIPS, supra note 
14, art. 1(1) (declaring that “[m]embers may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in 
their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that 
such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement”). 
 100. Berne, supra note 7, art. 7(6) (stating that “[t]he countries of the Union may 
grant a term of protection in excess of those provided by the preceding paragraphs”). 
 101. Article 10 of TRIPS, which came into force in 1995, states that “[c]omputer 
programs, whether in source or object code, shall be protected as literary works under the 
Berne Convention (1971).” TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 10. 
 102. Refer to notes 24–28 supra and accompanying text (concluding that the basic 
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will necessarily go in only one direction: upwards. This, in turn, 
means that many of the information requirements for users in 
the countries of the South are necessarily and always under 
threat. What could be more unbalanced than a “there are no 
maximums” agreement? (It is worth adding here that while the 
very first sentence of the preamble to the TRIPS agreement 
states that it aims “to reduce distortions . . . to international 
trade,”103 “no maximums” conventions and agreements with 
regard to property rights, such as Berne and TRIPS itself, are by 
their very nature trade-distorting, and further perpetuate the 
inequality between rich and poor nations.) 
Second: As the first sentence of the preamble to Berne 
makes clear, the Berne Convention has a single stated purpose: 
“the desire to protect, in as effective and uniform a manner as 
possible, the rights of authors in their literary and artistic 
works.”104 No other purposes or rights are stated, and indeed, few 
other specific rights for users, the supposed balancing force in the 
copyright metaphor, are enumerated.105 Any other specific 
possible rights for users, such as “fair use” or “fair dealing,” are 
considered as merely discretionary and “a matter for legislation 
in the countries of the Union.”106 But even then, any such possible 
(but, again not mandatory) uses or exemptions are restricted in 
their scope and application by phrases that state such 
reproduction must not “conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work.”107 This means that Berne specifically enumerates and 
essentially guarantees a sweeping list of rights for authors, while 
remaining either silent or provisional or partial on the rights of 
users. If an equilibrium presumes that there is one force—in this 
case, the rights of users—that has the capacity and capability to 
counteract the power of the opposing force—in this case, the 
rights of authors—the former force here is so truncated and 
feeble that it is unable to perform an equilibrating function. The 
consequences of this imbalance for the overall thrust of 
international copyright litigation or WTO-based dispute 
resolution should be obvious: A country of the South or users in 
                                                          
presumptions and practices of the Berne Convention coupled with the current 
international economic environment make significant reform extremely difficult, if not 
impossible). 
 103. TRIPS, supra note 14, pmbl. 
 104. Berne, supra note 7, pmbl. 
 105. Id. art. 10(1) (permitting the qualified use of quotations). 
 106. Id. art. 10(2). 
 107. Id. art. 9(2); WCT, supra note 16, art. 10. Refer to notes 79–83 supra and 
accompanying text (lamenting that neither Berne nor TRIPS mandate or give clear 
guidance for creating or enforcing exemptions or limitations to rights protection). 
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the South have an extremely narrow basis within Berne’s articles 
on which to argue that a rich country was failing to provide 
sufficient access to copyright-protected works produced within a 
rich industrialised country.108 
Third: It is in the process of change and the resolution (or 
attempted resolution) of conflicts that the nature of any system, 
including the international copyright system, can best be 
understood and assessed. Approaches that were seldom discussed 
or were seldom visible may suddenly be revealed, and all of a 
system’s contradictions may glow red hot. In the 1950s and 
1960s, many of the newly independent countries, predominantly 
located in Africa and Asia, concluded that the Berne Convention 
and its premises did not work in their interests and they 
mounted an ambitious, nearly decade-long effort to reform a few 
of Berne’s premises. For example, one of their immediate and 
longer-term objectives was the education and literacy of their 
own citizens: “[M]ost of them realised that the quickest way to 
accomplish this end was through the use of copyrighted 
materials, primarily textbooks, from the more advanced 
countries.”109 And in the preparations leading to the 1967 
Stockholm Revision Conference and its resulting Protocol, the 
countries of the South did appear to be gaining some important 
concessions which, if implemented, would have been of valuable 
assistance in loosening up Berne’s antiquated restrictions; these 
actions resulted in a significant tilt in the direction of users’ 
rights for the countries of the South. But then a frankly 
hysterical counter-attack, led by authors’ organisations and some 
governments, especially the United Kingdom, was launched110 
and, by the time of the 1971 Paris Convention that wrapped up 
                                                          
 108. Users and countries of the South might try to argue that Article 27 of the U.N. 
Declaration of Human Rights provides the right “to enjoy the arts,” but this is unlikely to 
be able to trump the enumerated rights of property holders established in Berne. See 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 27, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., at 71 U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). The limited practicality and ability of a country of the 
South to actually launch such litigation, for example, before a WTO dispute resolution 
panel, further weakens the impact of the already limited rights. 
 109. Johnson, supra note 26, at 93. Although Johnson is not especially sympathetic 
to the views of the countries of the South, his ninety page seldom-cited article provides an 
excellent introduction to the various conferences and conflicts of the 1960s. See 
RICKETSON, supra note 7, at 615–16 (describing the controversy between developing 
nations over the breadth of copyright protection for works exclusively used for 
educational, scientific, or scholastic purposes during the development of the Stockholm 
Protocol). 
 110. See Johnson, supra note 26, at 151, 153, 156 (describing international authors’ 
organizations’ reactions to the Stockholm Protocol, including that it “serve[d] no purpose,” 
that it was “irrational,” and that it “would make the works of foreign authors available in 
developing countries by means of confiscation or expropriation”). Refer to note 28 supra. 
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the attempted decade of reform, the resulting Appendix to the 
Berne Convention proved to be of insignificant assistance to the 
countries of the South.111 “It is hard to point to any obvious 
benefits that have flowed directly to developing countries from 
the adoption of the Appendix,” Ricketson wrote in 1987,112 and 
there is no evidence that the situation has improved in the past 
fifteen years. (Indeed, with the massive growth of information 
and information sources in the past decade, aided by the advent 
of digitalisation, one could well argue that the disparity in access 
to knowledge and information between rich and poor nations has 
increased.) For the countries of the South, the sharp conflicts 
over Berne in the 1960s and the meagre results achieved reveal 
that Berne could not accommodate their needs; it was a system 
that simply could not be balanced. 
Fourth: As a legal system of protection (and restriction), 
copyright is designed to provide, in a prevailing utilitarian view, 
an incentive for the creation of expressions needed for “progress 
of the arts” and, in a Lockean or “just desserts” view, as a 
property reward for the expenditure of labor. For copyright to 
subsist in an expressive work, it must: (a) be original, 
(b) originate, as a work, from a single (or possibly joint) author, 
and (c) be fixed (or recorded).113 In the industrialised North, 
reflecting one expressive tradition, the majority of expressive 
works meet these criteria and hence are eligible for copyright 
protection under the provisions of the Berne Convention and 
individual domestic copyright statutes. In the South, however, 
expressive forms and histories are often very different. Certainly 
among indigenous peoples, but in the wider societies of many 
Southern countries as well, there are ancient and continuing 
traditions that are based on oral (that is, nonrecorded and 
nonfixed) forms of expression, such as storytelling and 
indigenous knowledge, and which are derived from a folk or 
collectively-created history.114 With such forms, there are severe 
problems in demonstrating originality and single, discrete 
authorship, and hence the subsistence of copyright. The result: 
                                                          
 111. See STORY CIPR, supra note 9, at 49–52 (examining the history following the 
adoption of the “Appendix model” and suggesting that it “has failed to overcome the 
severe information divide in printed materials between rich and poor nations”). 
 112. RICKETSON, supra note 7, at 663; see also STORY CIPR, supra note 9, at 49–52 
(analyzing some of the reasons why the Appendix has not been of assistance to poor 
countries). 
 113. See, e.g., Berne, supra note 7, art. 2(1). In the United Kingdom, these 
requirements are set forth in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, ch. 1, §§ 1, 
3–10 (Eng.). 
 114. Refer to text accompanying notes 120–25 infra (detailing the traditions in 
China, Indonesia, and Africa for passing culture to future generations). 
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Berne protects only certain forms of cultural and artistic 
expressions, that is, those primarily existing in rich 
industrialised countries, and it overlooks many such forms that 
exist in the countries of the South.115 In other words, Berne is 
unbalanced and lopsided in its orientation. 
One British commentator, looking at why the balancing 
metaphor in law was misleading, wrote: 
“Balancing” or “weighing” or “measuring” any two or more 
things presupposes some standard or yardstick with 
reference to which they are gauged. What is important is 
the latter, and the whole notion of “balancing” interests is 
subordinate to the standard or yardstick of evaluation, 
namely, some ideal or value. Interests cannot be just 
“balanced.” Only with reference to a given ideal is it 
possible to say that the upholding of this interest is more 
likely to achieve it than another; and if a different ideal 
were espoused the reverse might be the case. The “weight” 
of an interest varies according to the objective in view.116 
This quotation also sums up why the international copyright 
system, including the substantive provisions of the Berne 
Convention, is neither balanced nor balanceable for the countries 
and peoples of the South. It is a hierarchical system of 
straitjackets, not balances, in which large multinational 
corporations, such as motion picture, software, and publishing 
firms, have used Berne’s central figure of “the author” as a 
surrogate to further spread their copyright power across the 
globe, including within the countries of the South. Under Berne, 
the active promotion (or threatened diminution) of authors’ 
rights becomes the sole standard or yardstick of evaluation. 
Berne is revealed as an unbalanceable international vehicle to 
govern relationships between widely unequal countries with 
regard to their current capacities to produce, trade, and use 
copyrighted works. 
IV. COPYRIGHT AS AN IDEOLOGY AND CONCEPT 
EXPORTED TO THE SOUTH 
The Berne Convention represents far more than a set of 
aggregated individual rules and prescriptions for the governance 
of global copyright relationships. It also encapsulates and 
                                                          
 115. This conclusion is not meant to endorse the view that such nonfixed or not 
“original” and “nonauthored” works should be protected by copyright and, indeed, there 
are many reasons why such an expansion of copyright should be opposed. 
 116. R.W.M. Dias, The Value of a Value-Study of Law, 28 MOD. L. REV. 397, 400 
(1965). 
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reinforces a particular ideological view as to how creativity and 
communications come to life, the centrality of those individually 
“creating” expressive works and the individual source of their 
expressions, the importance and meaning of these works, and 
what should happen to the fruits of their creativity. All of the key 
explicit (and implicit) words and phrases found in Berne, 
especially “authors” and “authorship” and “private property,”117 
but also “moral rights,” “intellectual creations,” “works,” 
“national treatment,”118 “legitimate interests of an author,” and 
“normal exploitation of the work,” are freighted with a set of 
powerful philosophical, political, cultural, and economic 
assumptions. These assumptions coalesce to form a wider 
ideological worldview, although, to be clear, the fact that they are 
ideological is not intended as a criticism; critics of these values 
also operate on the basis of an ideology (or ideologies). There are, 
however, two closely related consequences stemming from the 
internalisation of what we could call a Berne copyright 
ideology.119 First, Berne’s particular approach to the creation and 
use of expressions is naturalised or normalised as the only way 
(or the only valid or only important way) to understand and 
regulate expressive communications, or “works,” to use the 
traditional copyright term of art. Second, critical self-reflection or 
self-interrogation of the Berne copyright model is necessarily 
restrained and limited by the particular ideological spectacles 
through which both the world and the creation, use, and 
regulation of expressions are examined. It is difficult, for 
example, to think of two concepts that carry a greater emotional 
and ideological wallop than authorship and private property. 
A full exploration of the claim made here that copyright is an 
ideology which has been (and is actively being) exported to the 
countries of the South is beyond the scope of this Essay. 
Certainly four arguments related to Berne are, I think, relatively 
uncontroversial. First, assuming for a minute that the ideology of 
creating and using expressive materials has been, and still is, 
rather different in France, Britain, and the United States, on the 
one hand (which we will call the Western approach to copyright) 
                                                          
 117. The phrase “private property” is not explicitly found in Berne, but the view that 
works should be protected as commodities under the exclusive control of an author 
pervades almost every article and subsection of Berne. The preamble to TRIPS specifies 
that “intellectual property rights are private rights.” TRIPS, supra note 14, pmbl. 
 118. Although the Berne Convention does not use the precise phrase “national 
treatment,” it is the copyright term of art that expresses the requirement enunciated in 
Article 5(3). Berne, supra note 7, art. 5(3). 
 119. The Berne copyright ideology is not a homogenous one. For example, France and 
the United States, two leading convention countries, take radically different approaches 
to the issue of the moral rights of authors. 
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and, to take three other examples, China, Indonesia, and Nigeria, 
on the other (which we will call the non-Western approach, 
though again it is hardly a homogenous approach), it is hardly 
surprising that not even the barest traces of the non-Western 
approach are found within the articles of the Berne Convention. 
With the exception of Haiti and Tunisia, no country of the South 
played any part whatsoever in drafting the Berne Convention in 
1886. Although there have been a range of amendments made to 
Berne at a number of subsequent international revision 
conferences, the basic ideological assumptions of Berne have 
remained unchanged throughout its 117-year history. Second, 
many of the newly independent countries that have come into 
existence since World War II were already covered by Berne 
while they were colonial possessions, and these countries were 
unable to (or choose not to attempt to) make any changes to 
Berne when they joined the Berne Convention as individual new 
members.120 Third, the 1971 Paris Amendments to Berne, which 
incorporated the ineffective and insignificant Appendix, did not 
challenge Berne’s basic assumptions. Fourth, the 1995 TRIPS 
agreement merely incorporated Berne’s articles and Appendix 
(and its ideological worldview), and all of the other TRIPS 
articles dealing with copyright and related rights (Articles 10 to 
14) reinforced and spread Berne’s approach to works such as 
computers and compilations of data. In other words, Berne has, 
during its 117-year history, been insulated from any challenges 
posed by alternative approaches. 
None of the above proves, of course, that a range of 
alternative approaches and assumptions to Berne actually exist 
in the countries of the South. And while this remains a 
significantly under-researched area in the West, including among 
intellectual property scholars, and while the hegemony of Berne’s 
copyright ideology is hardly under threat, we should welcome the 
significant scholarship of the past decade which, whether 
intentionally or not, supports the claim that the Western 
approach to copyright is neither universal across the globe nor a 
pre-condition for the creation of expressions. As Daniel Burkitt 
writes, “some commentators have begun to uncover the negations 
of the individualistic and commodity based notions of intellectual 
property [and especially copyright] that have crystallised to form 
the Western and (increasingly) international model of copyright 
and the universalism with which they are propounded.”121 The 
                                                          
 120. Refer to note 23 supra and accompanying text. 
 121. Daniel Burkitt, Copyrighting Culture—The History and Cultural Specificity of 
the Western Model of Copyright, 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 146, 146 (2001). Brad Sherman 
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radically different traditions and approaches to creativity, 
community, and property rights among indigenous peoples have 
been a particular focus of such scholarship.122 To Steal a Book Is 
an Elegant Offense, the title of one recent book on China, hints at 
that country’s strong antagonism and alternative orientation to 
Western conceptions of intellectual property.123 More mainstream 
work on former colonies such as Indonesia reveals how the 
traditions of customary Indonesian adat law, based on visible 
legal constructs, “do not recognise the sale of intangible goods”124 
and emphasise the strong sense of community solidarity as 
opposed to individualism and concepts such as individual 
authorship.125 Other examples of the rich cultural forms that have 
flourished, for instance, in Nigeria (Yoruba art) and in South 
Africa (community choir singing) outside of copyright 
parameters, raise questions about the validity of the often-
proclaimed mantra that copyright laws and protections are a 
necessary pre-condition to the creation of expressive works. 
When Berne was formed in 1886, it did express the shared view 
of authors and governments located primarily in one relatively 
homogenous corner (or region) of the world as to how copyright 
relationships should be regulated; today, it is not fit for the 
purpose of providing the consensual basis for a global regulatory 
and statutory regime because it is, among other reasons, a 
foreign and imposed ideology to a significant percentage of the 
world’s population. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Up until this point in this Essay, most of the emphasis has 
been on attempting to explain and theorise why the Berne 
                                                          
mentions “the tendency to treat principles [of copyright] as if they were ahistorical, 
absolute concepts, but also by the belief that these principles can be used to identify the 
(unified) essence of copyright law.” Id. at 147 (quoting Brad Sherman, From the Non-
Original to the Ab-Original: A History, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON 
COPYRIGHT LAW 111, 118 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994). Burkitt’s article is 
one of the better comparative surveys of Western and non-Western approaches. 
 122. For explorations of creativity and forms of expression among indigenous 
peoples, see for example, ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW (1998); Anne Barron, No Other 
Law? Author-ity, Property and Aboriginal Art, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ETHICS 37 
(Lionel Bently & Spyros Maniatis eds., 1998); Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectively: 
Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 175 (2000). 
 123. P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE (1995); see also Burkitt, 
supra note 121, at 175–81. 
 124. Simon Butt, Intellectual Property in Indonesia: A Problematic Legal Transplant, 
24 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 429, 434 (2002). 
 125. Id. 
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Convention and its presumptions not only do not assist, but 
directly hinder the access to information and knowledge needs of 
the countries of the South. Moreover, the Berne ideology 
reinforces existing global economic inequalities. Yet, in 
concluding, we should not forget the intensely practical—and 
principally negative—implications of the current global copyright 
system for such countries. Eighteen months ago, I conducted 
some research on a range of copyright issues in the countries of 
the South for the (U.K.) Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights; a particular focus of the research was the role of 
copyright in blocking access to information required for 
educational purposes, including for literacy campaigns and other 
social development purposes.126 Here is a snapshot of some of the 
issues and problems that are presently occurring with regard to 
the use of hard-copy educational materials in sub-Saharan 
Africa;127 it should be noted that access to hard-copy materials is 
still extremely important in the countries of the South, as levels 
of both computer ownership (and computer use or access) and 
Internet access, especially in the poorest countries, are far below 
those found in rich, industrialised countries. 
* In Southern Africa, nursing teachers, public health nurses, 
and other medical personnel who wish to distribute copyrighted 
materials to students and patients about HIV/AIDS, how to avoid 
becoming infected, and how to deal with the symptoms, are 
required to pay copyright royalty fees.128 As a result, circulation of 
such information is seriously restricted. Most such fees are paid 
to publishers in developed countries. 
* Both the cost and availability of printed works remain 
central problems, especially in the poorest African nations. 
African public and most academic libraries are severely under-
resourced. “Libraries in Africa have been shown to be hard to 
sustain . . . the reality [is] empty shelves and worn-out book 
stock,” as one librarian, who has worked in various parts of 
Africa over the past twenty years, explained. Copyright 
restrictions increase the problem. 
* The traditional and limited Berne exemptions such as the 
right to use quotations (Article 10(1)) or the “fair practice” use of 
works “for teaching” (Article 10(2)) fail to appreciate the much 
                                                          
 126. STORY CIPR, supra note 9, at 47–63. 
 127. The citations from this report, mostly to interview notes and e-mails on file with 
the Author, have been omitted from this version of the research findings. 
 128. Neither the Berne Convention nor South African copyright legislation contains 
a public health exemption permitting free access to health care information. 
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wider access requirements to learning and resources materials 
across Africa. 
* Distance learning is an increasingly common avenue for 
the provision of educational opportunities in Africa, in part 
because of internal transportation and communications barriers. 
Distance learning students are particularly in need of good 
access to materials because they cannot easily visit a library at 
their schools or universities. Yet, copyright use allowances often 
are restricted only to those uses that occur within the physical 
location of a school or a library, and hence tens of thousands of 
students and their teachers cannot access badly needed print 
materials. 
* There is a major problem with the translation of materials. 
This is particularly serious because many African countries have 
more than ten languages. In the production of materials across 
Africa, “local languages are ignored in favour of English, French, 
or Portuguese,” one librarian noted. There are also few 
translations of works from one African language into another 
(e.g., from Bantu (South Africa and elsewhere) into Edo, Yoruba, 
or Hausa (Nigeria), or vice versa). Generally, the right to make a 
translation must be individually acquired for each translation 
into a different language. The overall situation reinforces the 
inequality of languages, privileges European languages, and 
means that tens of millions of Africans are unable to get access to 
or read books and articles published in languages other than 
their own. 
* Under existing copyright laws, people in Africa who are 
illiterate can only attempt to access materials under restrictive 
“fair dealing” provisions. But a facilitator working in a local 
resource centre, which is not considered “a library,” cannot 
legally make multiple copies of materials to assist illiterate 
persons in learning how to read. Given the importance of the 
need to improve literacy in least developed countries, this is a 
particularly serious restriction.129 
* British universities that seek to establish linked (“sister”) 
educational programmes in lesser-developed countries run into a 
number of copyright restrictions; for example, materials cleared 
by the U.K. Copyright Licensing Agency for domestic U.K. use 
cannot legally be used by students at overseas universities. 
                                                          
 129. For more on the barriers to access that copyright creates for illiterate and 
visually impaired persons in South Africa, see Denise Nicholson’s prize winning essay in 
the WIPOUT intellectual property counter-essay contest. Denise Nicholson, Does 
Copyright Have Any Significance in the Lives of Illiterate or Visually-Impaired Persons?, 
at http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j013/wipout/essays/1128nicholson.htm (Nov. 28, 2001). 
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* Copyright clearance officers in schools and universities in 
South Africa regularly engage in heated negotiations with 
publishers, especially international publishers, regarding the 
cost and use of works to be photocopied for student use. The rates 
charged are extremely expensive, and most copyright clearers 
generally tend to prefer dealing with local publishers where 
copyright fees are less expensive. 
* Publishers in Africa face a range of problems in acquiring 
reproduction and translation rights from publishers in developed 
countries. “If someone is sitting in London who is in charge of 
rights and permissions and that person is dealing with someone 
in, for example, Germany who will pay a large fee for rights and 
someone from a small African nation where they have to give 
discounted or free service, obviously you know what happens,” 
explained an academic who studied African publishing issues. 
Acquiring reprint and translation rights remains an overly 
complicated process and, as one Kenyan publisher explained, “in 
the few exceptional cases where European publishers grant 
rights to their African counterparts, this is usually done on harsh 
and unfavourable terms.” 
As I have already mentioned,130 global or individual domestic 
copyright systems and their range of restrictions are not the 
principal barrier to use and access of materials in the countries 
of the South. A number of other factors, including the wide 
disparity in per capita income in comparison to rich industrial 
countries, high levels of foreign debt, less emphasis on 
educational development, and lacklustre government 
performance, are often more important reasons for this lack of 
access to traditional printed materials in particular poor 
countries than are copyright restrictions themselves. There are 
other factors that need to be taken into account with regard to 
digitalised information. Although there are also important 
copyright restrictions on the use of such data, if a student or 
academic (or other person) does not have access to a computer, 
nor cheap and reliable access to the Internet131 (and both 
problems remain widespread in the countries of the South, 
including for our academic colleagues), copyright problems take a 
clear second or third place as an access hurdle. Nevertheless, 
copyright definitely creates a further barrier to access, as the 
above examples reveal, and the global inequality in the private 
property rights of copyright further reinforces and, indeed, is one 
                                                          
 130. Refer to note 9 supra. 
 131. For more background on these Internet access issues, see STORY CIPR, supra 
note 9, at 35. 
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source of global inequality and unequal opportunity more 
generally. 
I have argued here that the Berne Convention should be 
repealed as it does not and, in fact, cannot serve the interests of 
more than three-quarters of the world’s population. Any radical 
reforms, such as abolition of the national treatment requirement 
or establishing a maximum standard of copyright protection, 
would so substantially gut Berne’s foundational principles that it 
hardly seems worth the effort to attempt to pour a wholly new 
“wine” into an old Berne “bottle.” Now perhaps these comments 
on the failings of the international copyright system are of less 
interest to U.S. copyright scholars than, for example, the current 
U.S. debates over duration of copyright that have been sparked 
by the Eldred v. Ashcroft132 decision and that are addressed in the 
papers of other participants of the 2003 IPIL/Houston Santa Fe 
Conference. Yet, further scrutiny of the international copyright 
system has direct relevance to the Eldred case and can provide 
one more argument for those opposed to the latest U.S. extension 
of copyright. 
One of the central justifications for copyright is that authors 
and creators need an incentive to produce their works and that 
the dangers of free riding by nonproducers, if not curbed, will 
“deter creators from making socially valuable intellectual 
products in the first instance.”133 In the same vein, extending the 
term of copyright will purportedly create a greater incentive, 
which again presumably is needed for the economically efficient 
production of creative copyrightable works. How large should 
that incentive be and how long should it last? On this question, 
copyright scholars can learn from an argument recently 
advanced by Peter Gerhart, which, although focusing on patents, 
has equal relevance to copyright law and the proper incentives 
that are purportedly required for an optimum level of creation.134 
Gerhart notes that, under existing international intellectual 
property conventions and agreements, each country is allowed to 
determine, within certain limits, “the amount of protection that 
                                                          
 132. 123 S. Ct. 769, 775 (2003) (holding that the Copyright Term Extension Act of 
1998 neither violated the Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” prescription, nor the First 
Amendment’s free speech guarantee). 
 133. William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL 
AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY (Stephen Munzer ed., 2001) (citing William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 
325 (1989)), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/tfisher/iptheory.html. 
 134. Peter M. Gerhart, Why Lawmaking for Global Intellectual Property Is 
Unbalanced, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 309, 309–10 (2000). 
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achieves the balance appropriate to its circumstances.”135 That 
balance, as already explained and critiqued above, is the balance 
between the need for protection of innovation and creative work 
and the rights of users and consumers. The copyright “level” that 
has been determined for the U.S. does not assume that there will 
be global protection and enforcement of copyrighted works nor of 
global markets.136 But it is also assumed, Gerhart continues, that 
the former (i.e., pre-TRIPS) intellectual property system in the 
U.S. did maintain the proper balance.  
Extending the geographical scope and parameters of 
copyright protection to countries of the South, as TRIPS intends 
through the much stronger global enforcement of Berne, will—to 
use the predominant intellectual property metaphor Gerhart 
uses—tip the balance too much in favour of protection, will lead 
to over-protectionism, will give too great an incentive to creators, 
and will unbalance the U.S. copyright system.137 In the present 
period and more importantly, for many years into the future, the 
owners of U.S. copyright-protected works stand to make millions, 
indeed likely billions, of extra dollars in profits as a result of the 
global spread of the copyright system to the countries of the 
South. In a single stroke, vast amounts of extra financial 
incentives have been generated for U.S. rights holders. Of course, 
it is impossible to specify what will be the aggregated value of 
these new and unanticipated copyright revenues—windfall might 
be a more accurate word—that will be paid, in coming years, by 
Microsoft users in Nigeria, by Hollywood moviegoers in China, or 
by Indian readers of U.S. books and databases. This windfall to 
U.S. producers must be large enough, however, to at least cancel 
out the need for an extra twenty years of copyright protection in 
the U.S. and, here is a “subversive” thought, might even make 
the economic case to reduce the copyright term below the current 
Berne minimum of life plus fifty years. 
                                                          
 135. Id. at 309. 
 136. The U.S. has been one of the strongest critics of the extent and degree of 
unauthorised uses of copyrighted materials in the countries of the South. 
 137. Gerhart, supra note 134, at 310. 
